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THE EFFECTS OF LEADER SUCCESSION AND PRIOR LEADER EXPERIENCE ON 
POST-SUCCESSION ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
 
Leader succession is a critical issue for organizations, which has important implications for 
organizational performance (Guthrie & Datta, 1998: Kesner & Sebora, 1994). While the 
performance and actions of leaders are often scrutinized, boards and owners may also be subject to 
criticism regarding the effectiveness of their succession decisions (Elsaid, Wang, & Davidson, 
2011; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). Recent trends suggest that owners are increasingly looking to 
hire leaders with prior top leader experience, including directly hiring the leaders of other 
organizations (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014; Karlsson & Neilson, 2009; Lucier, Kocourek, & Habbel, 
2006). Owners may view the hiring of experienced leaders as a less risky decision than hiring 
inexperienced leaders, thereby avoiding the appointment of an unknown quantity. In this paper we 
explore the effect of two aspects of the effect of leader succession on post-succession 
organizational performance: (i) the actual succession event and (ii) the experience of the new 
leader. 
Karaevli (2007: 682), after reviewing the empirical evidence about the relationship between the 
leader succession event and post-succession performance, argued that: “scholars have failed to 
reach a consensus on whether succession events in general, and insider vs. outsider successions in 
particular, affect firm performance positively, negatively, or insignificantly.” In addition, and in 
contrast to the body of scholarship focusing on the relationship between the leader succession event 
and post-succession performance, research into the effects of prior leadership experience on 
organizational performance is in its infancy (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). Interestingly, the two 
main studies find an absence of positive performance effects (or even negative performance effects) 
for the effect of prior leadership experience on post-succession performance (see: Elsaid et al., 
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2011; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). We suggest that these findings oppose conventional wisdom that 
having prior experience in the top job should enhance leaders’ skills, which should lead to positive 
outcomes. 
In this paper we contribute to theory by drawing on insights from human capital theory, learning 
and asymmetric information to better understand the relationship between the succession event and 
leadership experience on post-succession performance. First, we contribute to the succession 
literature, addressing Karaevli’s (2007) finding of equivocal results between the leader succession 
event and post-succession performance, by decomposing outside appointments into active leaders 
hired directly from other organizations and those not currently in the top leader position. In doing 
so, we explore how differences in the origin of the newly hired outside leader may affect post-
succession performance and, in addition, examine the corollary in terms of the effects of how the 
nature of the departure of the predecessor leader affects post-succession performance. Second, we 
contribute to the emerging literature on prior top leader experience and post-succession 
performance by decomposing top leader experience into the experience of leading a domestic 
competitor and the experience of leading a foreign competitor. In doing so, we contribute to the 
debate as to the portability of leaders human capital across different contexts (Murphy & Zábojnik, 
2004 & 2007). 
To explore our ideas we focus on leaders of soccer organizations that operated in the English 
premier league (EPL) from 1996 to 2010.1 We suggest that the EPL context is conducive for 
examining our ideas for two main reasons. First, the EPL is characterized by intense competition 
and high rates of successions (Brady, Bolchover, & Sturgess, 2008), with the average tenure of 
                                                 
1 We define a leader as a soccer organization’s head coach (or manager). In this context, a leader 
is the most important and well-known of all individuals in the organization’s upper echelons and 
is responsible for on-field performance, which has a major influence on financial performance. 
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EPL leaders falling from 3.12 years (120 games) in 1993 to around 1.47 years (56 games) in 2009 
(Bridgewater, 2010). Furthermore, it is common for leaders to be appointed from a range of 
different prior positions (including inside or outside of the organization, from abroad and/or 
directly from other organizations) and so we can examine the performance effects of mew leaders 
bringing in a diverse range of experiences to shape their new organizations. Second, the soccer 
industry intensifies and accelerates many of the problems faced by the leaders of business 
organizations (Brady et al., 2008). For example, like many other team sports, soccer teams are 
meticulously monitored by owners, fans and the media, and so their leaders are under enormous 
pressure to succeed and keep their jobs during performance difficulties (Rowe, Cannella, Rankin, 
& Gorman, 2005). Indeed, performance is assessed on a weekly, or a game-by-game, basis, in 
contrast to leaders of business organizations that are evaluated over a much longer time-scale (e.g., 
quarterly, mid-year, annually). Hence, the EPL provides an extremely useful context in which to 
examine issues of leader succession and organizational performance. 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
Drawing on extant research we argue that there are three main factors that will influence the 
relationship between leader succession and organizational performance: the knowledge and skills 
of the leader; the ability for the leader and organization to learn from one another; and the potential 
for asymmetric information in the hiring decision (Shen & Cannella, 2002b; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2003). 
First, leaders bring with them different skills and abilities depending on whether they come from 
inside or outside of the organization, which in turn has varying effects on performance. We root 
this idea in human capital theory (Becker, 1993; Castanias & Helfat, 1991). Human capital is 
defined as an individual’s knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; 
Harris & Helfat, 1997), which can be accumulated through education, employment, habits and 
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activities (Becker, 1993). As the boundaries of our study are constrained to intra-industry 
successions, we build on Castinias & Helfat’s (1991) classifications of generic skills, firm-specific 
and industry-specific skills. Firm-specific human capital is useful only to the firms which provide 
it and is not transferable whereas industry-specific human capital can be transferred within an 
industry but has less transferability across industries. Generic, or general, skills are those that can 
be transferred across organizations and industries. Another form of leader’s human capital is 
international experience. The transferability, and in turn the usefulness, of such an experience will 
depend on the extent to which a leader’s organization is located in a globalized industry, the 
international inter-dependence of the organization and the similarity in terms of national-level 
institutions (see: Crossland & Hambrick, 2007; Roth, 1995). We argue that prior top leader 
experience is a salient human capital attribute, which can affect the speed in which leaders can 
adapt to their new organization and the risks associated with their appointment. 
Second, for a new leader to be successful both the individual leader and the organization need 
to learn to work with one another (Boeker, 1997; Rowe et al., 2005; Virany, Tushman, & 
Romanelli, 1992; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). Learning can occur at the individual level and 
organizational level (Levitt & March, 1988). At the individual level, leaders need to learn about 
their environments absorbing salient information in order to make appropriate strategic decisions 
(Rowe et al., 2005). At the organizational level, organizations can learn from the leader who brings 
with him/her new knowledge (Boeker, 1997; Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2003). 
Third, each succession type is associated with some level of risk (Shen & Cannella, 2002b; 
Wiersema, 2002; Zhang, 2008). Risk arises because of the problem of asymmetric information, in 
that the leadership candidates will have more knowledge of their own abilities and willingness to 
work in the interests of the organization than those tasked with making the hiring decision (Zajac, 
1990). The greater the problem of asymmetric information in relation to the succession decision 
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the greater the potential for firms to make sub-optimal hiring decisions, which will have a negative 
effect on post-succession performance. Hiring organizations may perceive leaders with prior 
leadership experience, and especially those currently acting in the leader role, as less risky because 
they will have been better able to observe them in the top job prior to hiring. Although on some 
occasions the cause-effect outcomes of leader’s decisions may be difficult to interpret, hiring 
organizations should still be able to assess their actions and behaviors. 
Inside versus outside succession 
When hiring a new leader, those tasked with the succession decision must decide whether to 
hire from inside or outside of the organization, and if they go outside, to hire a current leader of 
another organization or hire from the pool of talent not currently employed as a leader. We begin 
by examining performance effects of going for an inside or outside candidate, which is influenced 
by the availability of internal candidates reflecting the succession planning practices of the 
organization (Cappelli, 2008; Friedman, 1986; Friedman & Olk, 1995), and the informational 
dynamics surrounding the succession decision (Zhang, 2008). 
The potential suitability of an internal candidate is, in part, shaped by the extent to which the 
board feels that the candidate has the suitable human capital to lead the organization. Scholars have 
argued that internal candidates have the advantage of firm-specific human capital, which may 
enhance firm performance (Bailey & Helfat, 2003). The firm-specific human capital helps to ensure 
that the internal candidate is better aligned with the organization, understanding their systems and 
procedures, as well as having the tacit knowledge of the organization. In contrast, the outside 
candidate will not have firm-specific human capital, and so may not represent a good fit with the 
needs of the hiring organization, or with its culture (Karaevli, 2007). 
In terms of the informational dynamics surrounding leader succession, scholars have argued that 
boards, when making a leader selection decision, will have more information about the skills and 
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abilities (i.e., human capital) of inside candidates than outside candidates due to a higher frequency 
of interactions and internal networks (Karaevli, 2007; Shen & Cannella, 2002a; Zajac, 1990; 
Zhang, 2008). We suggest, however, that the informational dynamics surrounding the leader 
succession decision are more complex. First, perceived informational problems associated with 
outside candidates will encourage boards to have a higher propensity to hire inside candidates, 
thereby making more marginal decisions (Coff, 1997; Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999). Second, 
boards face the risk that the status of an inside candidate as a “known quantity” may enable the 
individual to “sail through a lax due-diligence process” (Charan, 2005: 75). Relatedly, scholars 
have argued that the trend in hiring outside candidates may reflect greater board diligence in 
matters of corporate governance (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001). Furthermore, Lauterbach et al. 
(1999) found that inside successors tend to perform worse than outside successors, suggesting that 
the internal selection decision may commonly be suboptimal. 
Based on the above discussion we suggest that the potential positive performance effects of 
firm-specific human capital for inside candidates will be offset by problems associated with 
informational asymmetries in their appointment. Hence, when controlling for general leader human 
capital it is perhaps unsurprising that scholars have found, what Karaevli (2007) described as, 
equivocality of results in relation to post-succession performance. To address the equivocality of 
results, we de-compose the group of outside candidates into leaders hired directly from a leadership 
position at a competitor (i.e., poached) and leaders who were hired from a pool of available talent 
not currently in a leadership position and examine their impact on post-succession performance. 
According to Friedman and Singh (1989), the positive effect of succession is most pronounced 
when the new leader’s human capital is matched to the organization’s task contingencies and when 
the leader is given the discretion to shape the organization. We argue that leaders that are poached 
away from their current employer will provide the hiring organization with more information about 
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their ability, as compared to those who are not currently in a leadership position, thereby reducing 
the risk of adverse selection in selecting the new leader. Furthermore, the leader may have been 
poached because the they have the specific human capital that the hiring organization requires or 
strives for (Boeker, 1997). Indeed, where a leader is hired directly from another organization, the 
succession event is likely to be more costly due to search and compensation costs, which suggests 
that the leader is more likely to be the organization’s number one choice, or close to it. Based on 
the above, we argue that leaders who are poached away from will be granted more autonomy to 
shape their new organization as compared to those who are not poached away. Relatedly, as 
poached leaders are outsiders to their new organizations, their early strategic are likely to be 
adaptive because they bring with them new ideas and are less likely to be influenced by the status-
quo, which will likely have a positive effect on organizational performance (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 
2010). Finally, being poached away is an indication that the leader was successful in their prior 
appointment, which may boost employee morale (Friedman & Saul, 1991) and motivate employees 
to take on board the leader’s ideas, and assist the leader by getting him/her up to speed regarding 
organizational idiosyncrasies. On the basis that poached leaders will have the human capital and 
autonomy to influence their new organizations, we suggest that their post-succession performance 
will be greater than non-poached leaders. Hence: 
 
H1: Leaders who move directly from the position of leader in one organization to 
leader of another organization are associated with higher post-succession 
organizational performance than outside leaders who are not in a leadership position. 
 
 
We now examine the reverse of the poaching decision to examine the effects of a departure of 
a predecessor leader when poached by a competitor. We suggest that having a leader poached away 
is an unplanned event (Friedman & Saul, 1991), and one that the organization will not have 
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prepared for, which will influence the relationship between new leader succession and post-
succession performance. 
We suggest that having a leader poached away will create an inertial and disruptive force 
because the organization is geared towards the predecessor’s paradigm and decisions. The fact that 
the prior leader left voluntarily indicates that the organization was happy with his/her leadership, 
and therefore did not want to change their current strategy and/or the organization’s current 
configuration. In contrast, a dismissal is an event that signals that the organization requires a change 
in direction (Friedman & Saul, 1991; Karaevli, 2007). Accordingly, the successor will likely 
struggle to imprint his/her ideas when taking charge and face, for example, entrenched cultures, 
institutionalized practices and investments that are specific to the prior leader (Fondas & Wiersema, 
1997; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). Relatedly, the departure of a 
poached predecessor leader will lead to a loss of firm-specific human capital, which will drain 
knowledge about how best to operate under the organization’s current configuration. For instance, 
researchers have argued that high organizational performance outcomes are not merely due to the 
inherent properties of the resources at a leader’s disposal, but rather are significantly influenced by 
the way in which a leader utilizes them (Brady et al., 2008; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007).  
Hence, we argue that new leaders will face a dilemma in their efforts to shape the organization. 
On the one hand, embracing the status-quo may prove to be problematic because the leader may 
not have the expertise and abilities to orchestrate the predecessor’s resource allocations and need 
time to learn about the organization. On the other hand, leaders that attempt to detach the 
organization from the predecessor’s decisions are likely to disrupt established structures and 
processes. As a consequence, having a leader poached away will result in the organization losing 
firm-specific knowledge about how to utilize its resources, which will have a negative impact on 
post-succession performance. Based on the above, we suggest that: 
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H2: Leaders whose predecessor was poached will be associated with lower post-
succession organizational performance than those who follow a leader who was 
dismissed. 
 
We now look past the origin of the leader to examine the nature of their human capital, focusing 
on the post-succession performance effects of domestic versus foreign top leader experience. 
Domestic versus foreign experience 
Human capital may be viewed as consisting of a hierarchy of skills and knowledge with varying 
degrees of transferability across contexts (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). The extent to which human 
capital is portable across organizations and contexts is subject to debate (Hamori & Koyuncu, 
2014). Researchers have suggested that CEO jobs have a considerable proportion of general human 
capital (Murphy & Zábojnik, 2004 & 2007), and that even the specific human capital associated 
with CEO positions has become easier to develop due to the computerized provision of firm-
specific information (Murphy & Zábojnik, 2007). Consequently, Murphy and Zábojnik (2004) 
argue that there has been a shift in the importance of general relative to firm-specific human capital, 
which has led to a reduction in the number of inside successions and more outside successions. 
Existing evidence about the effect of prior job-specific experience on an individual’s job 
performance, however, has been met with equivocal results. In terms of a positive effect, research 
has found that the prior acquisitions experience of outside directors was positively associated with 
the performance of their focal firm’s acquisitions and that prior entrepreneurial experience of actors 
was associated with successful new ventures (McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008; Stuart & 
Abetti, 1990). In contrast, evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between prior job-
specific experience, in relation to being CEO, and post-succession performance (Elsaid et al., 2011; 
Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014), which is explained in terms of prior experience slowing down learning 
in a new context because some knowledge and skills need to be "unlearned" before learning in the 
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new context can take place (Morrison & Brantner, 1992). Finally, Bragaw and Misangyi (2013) 
found no significant relationship between prior CEO experience and performance. 
We suggest that the presence of equivocal results stems from a lack of precision as to the nature 
of prior job-specific experience. In considering the performance effects of general human capital, 
which is not specific to a particular firm, we delineate between two forms of leadership experience, 
that of being a leader at a domestic competitor firm (i.e., a firm of similar standing domestically) 
and that of being a leader at a foreign competitor (again of similar standing). In examining the 
potential for performance differences to accrue to different forms of leader-specific human capital 
we draw on two related theoretical explanations. 
First is the extent to which a new leader may bring with them new skills and knowledge into the 
organization, which is complementary to the organization’s own, thereby promoting performance 
improvements. Drawing on ideas from the resource-based view of the firm we argue that given the 
same set of resources, different leaders may see different possibilities for their utilization (Kor, 
Mahoney, & Michael, 2007; Penrose, 1959). Where leaders’ prior experience is very closely related 
to the new firm then this will limit the potential for learning outside of areas where the firm already 
holds prior knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). For example, 
in an industry there may be common approaches to leadership, so hiring a leader with leadership 
experience with another domestic competitor will do little to introduce new knowledge and 
perspectives into the firm. Rather, hiring someone with experience of leading a domestic 
competitor may merely reinforce existing practices and reduce innovation in organizational 
practices. In contrast, hiring a leader with experience of leading a foreign competitor may lead to 
a greater diversity of leadership knowledge in the organization, which may stimulate innovation in 
organizational practices. 
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Second, and related to the issue of knowledge diversity, is the ability of the new leader to learn 
about their new position. Hamori and Koyuncu (2014), drawing on the position of Morrison and 
Brantner’s (1992) work on actor’s ability to learn their new job, suggest that where the job-specific 
experience is very similar to the new role the leader will perform, then issues relating to 
“unlearning” will be particularly pronounced. A leader’s perception of having job-specific 
experience may mean that they underestimate differences between the organizations that they have 
led, and now will lead (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). We suggest that two domestic competitors, 
although they may have many common attributes, may have very different values, norms and 
standards, and/or salient operational and cultural differences (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009; 
Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). 
We suggest that where actors have leadership experience with a domestic competitor they may 
be less able to learn about their new role, as they will merely seek to transfer existing practices as 
they underestimate the potential differences between organizations. In contrast, new leaders with 
experience of leading a foreign competitor will be more likely to be aware of the differences 
between organizations, having a greater variety of experience, and so be better able to understand 
the need to learn about the new job. We argue that leaders with foreign experience will be able to 
do so because they have been exposed to different values, cultural norms, institutional 
environments and hence new ways of learning and responding to stimuli (Ricks, Toyne, & 
Martinez, 1990). Studies that have examined the prior international experience of CEOs that were 
obtained when they were at lower level positions (e.g., international assignments at executive 
levels) have found a positive association with organizational performance (Carpenter, Sanders, & 
Gregersen, 2001; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000). 
Based on the arguments above we suggest that where leaders are recruited with experience of 
leading a domestic competitor then innovation in organizational practices may be stifled, and the 
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new leaders ability to learn about their new job diminished, which will negatively affect post-
succession organizational performance. In contrast, where leaders are recruited with experience of 
leading a foreign competitor then innovation in organizational practices may be increased, and their 
ability to learn about their new job enhanced, which will positively affect post-succession 
organizational performance. Hence: 
 
H3: Leaders with experience of leading domestic competitors are associated with lower 
post-succession organizational performance than leaders who do not have experience 
of leading domestic competitors. 
 
H4: Leaders with experience of leading international competitors are associated with 
higher post-succession organizational performance than leaders who do not have 
experience of leading international competitors. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
We test our model on leaders of soccer organizations that operate in the English Premier League 
(EPL). Professional team sports are an interesting research site for examining strategic 
management and leadership phenomena (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Bloom, 1999; Day, 
Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Katz, 2001), which has long been used as an empirical site for scholars of 
succession (Giambatista, 2004; Grusky, 1963; Ndofor, Priem, Rathburn, & Dhir, 2009; Pfeffer & 
Davis-Blake, 1986; Rowe et al., 2005). In addition to the suitability of the EPL context for testing 
our model, as outlined in the introduction, our context provides data that is reliable, objective and 
readily available, and researchers can identify and measure organizational performance and the 
human capital of leaders and team members (Audas, Dobson, & Goddard, 2002; Hughes, Hughes, 
Mellahi, & Guermat, 2010; Pazzaglia, Flynn, & Sonpar, 2012; Werner & Mero, 1999). 
Sample 
Our sample consists of longitudinal data from 1995/96 to 2009/10 of 119 leaders at 31 soccer 
organizations that operated in the EPL on a game-by-game basis. In total we have 4452 individual 
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game observations.2 Consistent with prior studies (Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013; Shen & 
Cannella, 2002b; Zhang, 2008), we use a post-succession (or early leader tenure) window to 
capture the performance effects of succession. We define our post-succession period as the first 
two years (i.e., seasons) of tenure. While we could focus specifically on the first season, some 
leaders, in our case 66 percent, are appointed within-season and so not all leaders would have been 
in place for a full first season of tenure.3 
We gathered performance data, on a game-by-game basis, from various football almanacs 
including Rothmans and Sky Sports Football Yearbooks. Financial and takeover data were 
obtained from Companies House and Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME). Data on leader 
tenure, succession and origin were obtained from Lexis-Nexis. Team member acquisitions data (of 
which there were over 1000 in total) were obtained from www.soccerbase.com and Lexis-Nexis. 
Dependent Variable 
 
Performance was measured as the points gained by a leader for each game (i.e., competitive event). 
In the EPL, teams are awarded three points for a win, one point for a draw and zero points for a 
loss. Using points as our dependent variable is consistent with prior studies that use a game-by-
game approach in a soccer context (Audas et al., 2002; Hughes et al., 2010). The frequency of 
observations for each of the performance categories for 3, 1, 0 were 1,645, 1,243 and 1,891 
respectively. 
Model Variables 
 
                                                 
2 Our sample contains only league games and not those relating to cup competitions. The logic is 
that not all organizations have access to cup competitions, which can create inconsistencies across 
organizations and leaders in the sample. Such an approach is in line with prior research (see: 
Hughes et al., 2010). We adopt a similar logic for interim leaders and those that were in place for 
less than 5 games and/or not made permanent were excluded from the sample. 
3 As a robustness check, we ran the models using leaders first 40 and 80 games in charge 
(irrespective of the seasonal time period). The results were largely unchanged. 
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Inside succession relates to leaders who were promoted from inside of the organization. We 
measure this as a binary variable coded one if a leader was hired from inside of the organization 
and coded zero otherwise. We identified 32 leaders that were inside appointments. 
Leader to Leader entry relates to organizations where a leader was directly hired from another 
organization where they were a leader. We measure this as a binary variable coded one if a leader 
was hired (or resigned in order to be hired) from another organization and coded zero otherwise. 
In our sample 47 leaders were poached leader entrants from other organizations.4  Among these 
poached entrants, there were cases in which leaders came from outside of the sample (i.e., outside 
of the EPL). Consistent with Boeker (1997), we treat these entrants just like those that move to 
other organizations that are within the sample. 
Leader to Leader exit relates to organizations where a predecessor leader has left to join another 
organization. We measure this as a binary variable coded one if the predecessor leader left to go to 
another organization and coded zero otherwise. We identified 21 leaders that were appointed post 
a poached leader exit. 
Domestic experience. We measure this as a binary variable coded one if the leader has been a 
top leader in the hiring organization’s domestic industry (i.e., the EPL) and coded zero otherwise. 
In our sample, we identified 56 leaders that had prior domestic leadership experience. 
Foreign experience. We measure this as a binary variable coded one if the leader has been a top 
leader at a foreign competitor and coded zero otherwise. We define foreign competitor in terms of 
organizations that competed in the top four European leagues outside of the EPL (France, Germany, 
Italy, and Spain) and/or had competed in the UEFA Champions league (the premier pan-European 
                                                 
4 As such, the base group consists of 40 leaders that were hired from outside of the organization 
that were not in a top leader position. Specifically, they are leaders that were not acting as leader 
in their prior organizations; leaders dismissed at their prior organizations and, on one instance, 
becoming leader immediately after the individual’s playing career. 
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competition which is restricted to the leading competitors in each domestic league) over the period. 
Employing this definition we are able to exclude foreign experience of leading organizations that 
are much smaller and less complex than EPL organizations. In our sample, 25 leaders had foreign 
leadership experience. 
Control Variables 
 
Lagged Performance was measured by lagging our performance (points) variable, by three games. 
Lag performance t-1, Lag performance t-2, and Lag performance t-3.5 Consistent with prior 
research, these values can be inferred as default expectations or momentum affects (Giambatista, 
2004; Hughes et al., 2010). 
Tenure was measured as the count of the number of games a leader was in position from 
appointment. 
Takeovers were measured as a binary variable, which we coded one if there was a takeover 
event and coded zero otherwise. We created a lead of 50 games (i.e., around one and one-half 
seasons) from the date of the takeover to fully capture the disruptions which may affect 
performance. 
Within-season succession relates to leaders appointed during the playing season. The timing of 
when a leader takes charge may affect post-succession performance, as within-season succession 
being more problematic for leaders as they do not have the off-season to shape their new 
organizations (Giambatista, 2004; Rowe et al., 2005). We measured this as a binary variable coded 
one if the leader was hired within the soccer season and coded zero otherwise. 
                                                 
5 As a robustness check, we lagged the point’s variable by up to five games. Our results were largely 
unchanged. 
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 Promoted leaders relates to those leaders who have joined the EPL through their organization 
being promoted6. We control for promoted leaders as promoted organizations tend to have lower 
levels of resources as compared to established EPL organizations, which may affect performance. 
We measure this as a binary variable, which we coded 1 if the leader of a soccer organization was 
promoted and coded 0 otherwise. 
Strategic changes were measured as the total number of team member entrants, which we 
employed as a rolling average over the first two seasons of a leader’s tenure. As new leaders enter 
their organizations, they may seek to align areas close to their world views (Gabarro, 1987; 
Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991). 
Team quality was measured as a soccer organization’s total wage cost, updated on a seasonal 
(yearly) basis. Wage costs are a well-accepted measure of team quality in the literature (Brady et 
al., 2008; Szymanski & Smith, 1997). 
Total experience is measured in terms of the total number of seasons a leader has held a leader 
position prior to appointment, and is independent of where the experience was gained. We employ 
this as a measure of general leader human capital. 
Model Estimation 
 
We use an ordered probit model (using STATA) as our dependent variable takes three outcomes, 
which follow a natural ordering —win (3 points), draw (1 point) and loss (0 points). Initially, a 
latent variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ can be given as follows: 
𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖 
                                                 
6 At the end of each season in the EPL, three teams are relegated (i.e., demoted) to, and three teams 
are promoted from, the Championship league (i.e., the league below the EPL). 
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where,  𝑦𝑖
∗ is an unobservable variable that signifies the game result, 𝑥𝑖 is a vector of explanatory 
variables for observation 𝑖, 𝛽 is a vector of unknown parameters that we aim to estimate and  𝜖𝑖 is 
a random error term. As we assume that the 𝜖𝑖 term is normally distributed, our unobservable 
variable 𝑦𝑖
∗ produces the three observed 𝑦𝑖 variables: 
𝑦𝑖 = Loss  If  𝑦𝑖
∗  <  𝜇1 
     𝑦𝑖 = Draw      If  𝜇1 < 𝑦𝑖
∗  <  𝜇2 
𝑦𝑖 = Win   If  𝑦𝑖
∗  >  𝜇2 
 
where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are the unknown threshold parameters that define the boundaries of the different 
levels of performance that our model seeks to estimate. Given that 𝜇2 >𝜇1, the appropriate 
probabilities can be generated as follows: 
Pr (𝑦𝑖=0) = 𝐹 (𝜇1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
Pr (𝑦𝑖=1) =  𝐹 (𝜇2 −  𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) − 𝐹(𝜇1 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
Pr (𝑦𝑖=3) = 1− 𝐹 (𝜇2 - 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽) 
 
where F is the normal cumulative distribution function. Ordered probit estimates for the threshold 
parameters and coefficients are generated by the maximum likelihood method. Employing an 
ordered probit approach is consistent with studies that use a game-by-game approach in such a 
context (Audas et al., 2002; Hughes et al., 2010). As our data are organized by team, in some cases 
we have two observations for each match. We allow for correlation of the error term in such cases 
by clustering standard errors by game. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the means, standard deviations and correlation coefficients for the variables that 
were employed in this study. Of the total number of leaders (119), 26.9 percent were inside 
appointments, 39.5 percent were hired directly from another organization and 33.6 percent were 
hired from a non-top leader outside position. In addition, 17.6 percent of leaders were appointed 
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after the predecessor leader was poached away. In terms of prior leadership experience, 47.1 
percent of leaders had domestic top leader experience and 21.0 percent had foreign leadership 
experience at an organization of a similar stature. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 presents the results of our hypotheses tests, which were analyzed using an ordered probit 
approach with performance (points) as the dependent variable. Seven models were estimated in 
total: model 1 includes the control variables only, models 2-6 build on the control model and 
examine the individual effects of our hypothesized variables, and model 7 is our full model that 
includes all variables. Our results in table 2 should be compared to their associated marginal effects 
in table 3 for each category of performance. Marginal effects show how the probability of being in 
a point’s category is impacted by a one unit increase in the focal independent variable.7 Marginal 
effects are salient as the signs of the coefficients in table 2 are not adequate, in isolation, for 
understanding whether or not a probability for a category either increases or decreases. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
 
We begin by commenting on the results relating to inside-outside succession. Our results show 
that, holding generic human capital constant, inside succession has no significant effect on post-
succession organizational performance. The results show the coefficient for inside succession is 
insignificant across models 2-6 with weak significance in model 7. Hence, it is important to 
examine leader origin in a more fine-grained manner. 
                                                 
7 For example, a negative value of a variable in the three point’s category means that the effect of 
that variable is less likely to be in the three point’s category. 
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Hypothesis 1 predicts that leaders that move directly from one organization to another 
organization (i.e., were poached) will have a positive association with post-succession 
organizational performance as compared to those hired that were not directly hired from a 
leadership position. The results show the coefficient is positive and significant (b= 0.09, p <0.05 
in model 3 and b= 0.10, p <0.05 in model 7). The marginal effects (table 3) are positive and 
significant at 1 point and are even more so at 3 points; therefore it is more likely to be in the win 
category. Specifically, all else equal, the probability of winning for poached leaders, as compared 
to non-poached leaders, increases by around 4 percent in any given game. As such, we find 
evidence to support H1. 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that predecessor leaders that move directly to another organization (i.e., 
were poached away) will have a negative association with post-succession organizational 
performance (i.e., at the departed organization) as compared to predecessor leaders that were 
dismissed. The results show that the coefficient is negative and significant (b= -0.09, p <0.10 in 
model 4 and b= -0.12, p <0.05 in model 7). The marginal effects are negative at 1 point and negative 
and significant at 3 points, hence it is more likely to be in the loss category. Specifically, all else 
equal, the probability of losing when a predecessor was poached away, as compared to when the 
predecessor was dismissed, increases by around 5 percent in any given game.  As such, we find 
evidence to support H2. 
Hypothesis 3 states that hired leaders with domestic top leader experience will have a negative 
association with post-succession organizational performance as compared to leaders with no such 
experience. The results show the coefficient is negative and significant (b= -0.13, p <0.01 in model 
5 and b= -0.10, p <0.05 in model 7). The marginal effects are negative at significant at 1 point and 
are even more so at 3 points, hence it is more likely to be in the loss category. Specifically, all else 
equal, the probability of losing for leaders with prior domestic leadership experience, as compared 
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to those with no such experience, increases by around 4 percent in any given game.  As such, we 
find evidence to support H3. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that leaders that have foreign top leader experience will be positively 
associated with post-succession organizational performance as compared to leaders that have no 
such experience. The results show the coefficient is positive and significant (b= 0.16, p <0.01 in 
model 6 and b= 0.12, p <0.05 in model 7).  The marginal effects are positive and significant at 1 
point and are even more so at 3 points; thus it is more likely to be in the win category. Specifically, 
all else equal, the probability of winning for leaders with prior foreign leadership experience, as 
compared to those with no such experience, increases by around 4 percent in any given game.  
Hence, we find evidence to support H4. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study we have examined two aspects of leader succession on post-succession organizational 
performance: (i) the actual succession event (at the organization level); and (ii) organizations that 
hired leaders with prior top leader experience (at the individual level). Grounding our ideas in 
theories of human capital, learning and asymmetric information, and testing our ideas in the context 
of English soccer organizations, our empirical findings suggest that the majority of our hypotheses 
have salient implications on post-succession organizational performance. Our work contributes to 
the work on leader succession and the nascent literature on the effects of leaders with prior top 
leader experience (see: Elsaid et al., 2011; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014) as detailed below. 
Leader Succession and Organizational Performance 
Research has long found equivocal results pertaining to the effect of outside successions on post-
succession organizational performance (see: Karaevli, 2007). Given organizations’ propensity to 
directly appoint leaders with prior leadership experience has increased over time (Karlsson & 
Neilson, 2009; Lucier et al., 2006), we decomposed outside successions into those that were hired 
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directly from the leader position at another organization and those that were not. In addition, we 
examined the corollary in terms of the effect on post-succession organization performance when a 
predecessor leader has departed to take a leadership position at another organization. 
First, we found support for the argument that newly appointed leaders that moved directly from 
a leader position at another organization (i.e., were poached) have better post-succession 
organizational performance as compared to those that were not in a leadership position. We suggest 
that hiring a leader of another organization will allow the organization to make a more informed 
selection decision and hence identify the human capital they require. In addition, the associated 
search and compensation costs will indicate that the candidate is either their first choice, or 
thereabouts. Consequently, in being perceived as having the required human capital to lead the 
organization, the new leader will be better able to gain discretion from owners to influence and re-
shape the organization (Friedman & Singh, 1989), which will enhance organizational performance. 
Furthermore, given our empirical focus is that of a single industry study, the finding may reflect 
the greater ease with which leaders can move between organizations, as compared to studies in 
which the sample of organizations are more heterogeneous in nature. 
In addition, the above finding contributes to recent work on prior top leader experience that has 
examined leaders that move directly between top leader positions, and runs counter to Hamori and 
Koyuncu’s (2014) finding of partial support for the reverse. We believe the difference in findings 
across the two studies is due to the fact that we focus on the decision to appoint an outside candidate 
and compare the performance effects against those not currently in a leadership position. In 
contrast, Hamori and Koyuncu (2014) compare direct CEO-CEO moves against individuals that 
held an executive position (e.g., a COO) between CEO jobs at their new organization, which in 
effect are inside candidates (i.e., they have firm-specific experience). Furthermore, our finding 
perhaps helps to highlight Friedman and Singh’s (1989) assertion that post-succession performance 
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is most likely to lead to performance increments when the selection process is rational in that the 
potential candidate’s competencies are better matched to the organization’s requirements and when 
they are given the discretion to shape the organization. 
Second, we find that the departure of predecessor leaders to go to another organization (i.e., 
leaders who are poached away) has a negative relationship with post-succession organizational 
performance. To our knowledge, ours is the only study that has examined such a relationship. We 
suggest that the new leader will enter an organization that is highly anchored in the decisions of 
the predecessor and so will likely face inertial pressures (Fondas & Wiersema, 1997; Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977; Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). Furthermore, the loss of firm-specific human capital 
will be drain knowledge that likely led to high performance outcomes. These factors will negatively 
affect leader’s ability to shape their new organization and performance accordingly. In highlighting 
the post-succession performance effects of how the prior leader stepped down from the leader role 
we contribute to the literature on the performance consequences of succession, which may shed 
new light on the previous equivocal findings (see: Giambatista, Rowe, & Riaz, 2005; Karaevli, 
2007; Kesner & Sebora, 1994). 
In addition, we contribute to the literature on succession as an adaptive mechanism. Prior 
research has shown factors that prevent a leader from adapting to their new organizations such as 
longer predecessor leader tenure (Shen & Cannella, 2002b) and predecessor leader remaining as 
board chair (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). While there may be many organizational and 
environmental factors that prevent a leader from adapting (see: Hannan & Freeman, 1977), our 
findings show that an important reason could be the predecessor leader departing to go to another 
organization.  Furthermore, our finding illuminates Lucier et al’s (2006: 9) argument about how 
poaching a leader, which they refer to as “beggar thy neighbor” recruitment, is problematic for the 
raided organization because they also have to find a replacement as a consequence. As such, these 
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organizations will likely face lost opportunities and disruptions while the new leaders are being 
selected and being brought up to speed. 
Prior Top Leader Experience and Organizational Performance 
 
We examined the relationship between prior top leader experience and post-succession 
organizational performance because although the number of newly appointed leaders with top 
leader experience has increased, studies have shown mixed performance effects (Bragaw & 
Misangyi, 2013; Elsaid et al., 2011; Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). We suggest that the presence of 
equivocal results stems from a lack of precision as to the nature of prior job-specific experience, 
and to address this we decomposed leader experience into leader experience at a domestic 
competitor firm (i.e. a firm of similar standing domestically) and that of being a leader at a foreign 
competitor (again of similar standing). 
First, we found that experience at a domestic competitor is negatively related to post-succession 
organizational performance. Our results suggest that having similar experience (i.e., in the same 
industry and, in our case the same industry domestically) may do little to introduce new insights 
into the organization and hence leaders will persist with similar practices. In addition, leaders’ 
belief of the transferability of leadership experience and their oversight as to the importance of 
idiosyncratic differences organizations possess may also relate to low performance. This finding is 
consistent with the work on job-specific (i.e., top leader) experience and post-succession 
organizational performance that has found that prior leadership experience in the same industry 
will harm performance rather than improve it (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014). 
Second, we found that prior leadership experience at a foreign competitor is positively related 
to post-succession organizational performance. Our result suggests that having foreign experience 
will likely enrich the human capital of leaders, which will allow them to not only have leadership 
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exposure but also be innovative and think independently of their organization’s context. The 
finding is consistent with work on CEO’s prior international experience (at non-CEO levels) that 
has found such experience will likely be a key organizational resource that can positively impact 
performance (Carpenter et al., 2001; Daily et al., 2000). Furthermore, because soccer is a 
globalized industry (Brady et al., 2008), this finding may provide evidence that foreign experience 
is perhaps most pronounced in such contexts. Accordingly, our finding is in line with current 
debates about the benefits of international experience on organization’s bottom-line performance 
(see: Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2000). 
Overall, our findings about domestic and foreign prior leader experience hold important insights 
into the relationship between leader human capital and performance, and the debate on whether or 
not general managerial human capital is portable or context specific (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2014; 
Murphy & Zábojnik, 2004 & 2007). 
Managerial Implications 
 
Our findings hold important early tenure performance implications for organizations when 
considering succession decisions. We suggest that the distinction between an inside and outside 
appointment may not be particularly relevant, rather it is the experience of the leader, and his/her 
congruence with the hiring organization, that has the greatest effect on performance. 
First, we begin by considering the negative post-succession implications of a leader being hired 
away by a competitor. We argue that the hiring away of a leader constitutes a disruptive event for 
the organization, and one they may not be able to prepare for. In order to minimize the probability 
of such an occurrence we suggest that owners need to look carefully into the different means by 
which they can ensure that their leader does not have their head turned. Different retention 
strategies may include the provision of extended contracts, enhanced pay, and also performance 
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related pay that is contingent on the leader remaining in post. Also, as owners cannot prevent a 
leader from leaving they need to be vigilant in terms of being clear about what they want from any 
leader, whether in post of the successor, and the identification of potential talent (both internal and 
external). We argue that not only should owners develop their own talent as potential heirs to the 
incumbent after mandatory retirement as well as having an understanding of the external talent 
market; they also need to bear in mind that the incumbent could depart at any time. Consequently, 
owners need to plan for such an occurrence, and think through who would be put into place in the 
event of a sudden departure (Dutra & Griesedieck, 2010). Although turbulence may be inevitable, 
by being clear about what the requirements are for the leader, and identifying potential candidates, 
owners may be able to make more informed hiring decisions that are less influenced by the 
problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection. 
Second, the findings about the relationship between prior top leader experience and post-
succession performance hold important insights for owners when hiring new leaders. Our results 
suggest that appointing leaders with leadership experience in the same domestic industry has a 
negative effect on post-succession performance; conversely leaders with prior foreign industry 
leadership experience have a positive effect on post-succession performance. We suggest, 
therefore, that owners need to think through what skills and knowledge they want the new leader 
to bring to their organization, and how they diversify the existing knowledge base of the 
organization. For example, having the same domestic industry experience may limit the 
individual’s ability to bring new knowledge to an organization. Once owners are clear about their 
requirements, they also need to manage the post-succession integration process carefully. Whether 
or not the hire has domestic and/or foreign experience, a big challenge for any new leader is the 
transition to their new company’s ways of operating (Davis, 2010). Accordingly, owners need to 
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take steps to ensure that the new leader is acclimatizing to, for example, the new organization’s 
processes, culture and history (Davis, 2010). 
Generalizability and Limitations 
 
Our paper follows the well-established tradition of employing sports industries, and sporting 
organizations, to study issues of leadership and human resource management (e.g., Berman et al., 
2002; Pazzaglia et al., 2012). Sporting organizations, and soccer in particular, can be generalizable 
to other types of business organizations as they share a range of common features as detailed below 
(Bolchover & Brady, 2002; Brady et al., 2008). 
First, soccer and business organizations are performance oriented. Although the performance of 
business organizations is commonly based around financial metrics, whereas performance of 
soccer organizations is based on winning, research suggests that on-field performance is 
significantly correlated with financial performance (Lewis, 2004; Giambatista et al., 2005). 
Second, soccer organizations follow a common set of rules and relegations, which are monitored 
and enforced by an impartial authority (Rowe et al., 2005). The rules and regulations govern the 
nature of competitive interactions between organizations and players, including aspects such as 
how games are played and the recruitment and retention of human resources (Ndofor et al., 2009). 
Indeed, these rules can administer competition similar to those experienced by business 
organizations that prohibit certain actions through regulation, competition (anti-trust) policy and 
employment legislation (Ndofor et al., 2009). Third, while leaders of soccer organizations are not 
identical to their CEO counterparts in business organizations, they share many common 
characteristics: being accountable to owners for performance and strategic decisions; needing to 
satisfy salient stakeholder groups (e.g., owners, fans, players, agents, media, community); and have 
a relatively high degree of control depending on board structure (e.g., duality or split-leadership 
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function) (Hughes et al., 2010; Ndofor et al., 2009; Rowe et al., 2005). Fourth, soccer organizations 
in the EPL are commercial organizations in that they are privately held, experience corporate 
activities such as takeover bids, and need to raise revenue from a range of different sources 
including game-day receipts, television rights, sponsorship and the trading of players. Furthermore, 
given that players are the key resource of soccer organizations (the majority of any cost base), and 
that soccer organizations are increasingly taking serious the issue of corporate social responsibility 
through, for example, community based initiatives such as social and cultural inclusion, then they 
are very much mirroring business organizations in being oriented towards the triple bottom line. 
Based on the above we argue that sporting organizations, and particular soccer organizations, 
are comparable to business organizations ensuring that our results should generalize beyond the 
soccer context. Furthermore, it is arguable that business leaders are now arriving where soccer (and 
other sporting) organization’s leaders have always been: open to immense scrutiny, at the mercy 
of disparate and demanding stakeholders and high levels of transparency (Bolchover & Brady, 
2002). In addition, ideas developed in the management of sporting organizations are stimulating 
thought about their applicability in business and commerce (see: Bryan & Rafferty, 2006; Wolfe, 
Wright, & Smart, 2006a & 2006b). 
As with all studies our work does have limitations, which we hope can provide directions for 
future research. First, like much research in the succession domain, we use archival data from 
published sources. Future research may use other research methodologies such as direct 
observations and/or field studies to better ascertain leader origins and the mechanics pertaining to 
leader initiated departures. Second, leaders that were appointed from outside of the organization in 
a non-leadership position consisted of dismissed prior leaders. Although the pool of readily 
available experienced leaders may be greater in the EPL than other contexts, the reduction in leader 
tenure rates will mean that other industries may mirror the EPL over time. We encourage scholars 
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to examine different industries, and hence other modes of outside successions, as compared to 
poached leaders. Third, we were unable to compare the effects of leaders being poached away with 
those that leave due to mandatory retirements because leader exits in the EPL largely consist of 
dismissals, being poached away and, in some cases, health related departures. Future research using 
different samples and contexts may be able to shed light on the matter. Finally, our study is 
conducted in only one industry. Consistent with prior single-industry research in succession and 
migration (e.g., Boeker, 1997; Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005), we argue that such a context allows 
us to better control for industry effects and have clear boundary conditions for our ideas. Given the 
data advantages as outlined above, and that the EPL is rife with top leader movements across 
organizations, we suggest that the benefits dominate any drawbacks present in our study. However, 
we encourage scholars to explore the issues we raise in this paper across different industry and 
organizational contexts to assess formally the extent to which our results are generalizable.  
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1.Lag performance t-1 1.31 1.30 
              
2.Lag performance t-2 1.32 1.30 0.01 
             
3.Lag performance t-3 1.33 1.30 0.07* 0.01 
            
4.Tenure 29.77 20.22 0.05* 0.04* 0.04* 
           
5.Takeovers 0.11 0.32 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
          
6.Within-season succession 0.62 0.49 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03* -0.13* -0.07* 
         
7.Promoted leaders 0.08 0.26 -0.05* -0.04* -0.03* 0.34* -0.06* -0.04* 
        
8.Strategic changes 0.30 0.46 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.22* 0.17* -0.26* 0.00 
       
9.Team quality 9.88 0.99 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* -0.10* 0.19* 0.20* -0.12* 0.08* 
      
10.Total experience 9.17 7.59 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.05* 0.08* 0.09* -0.07* 0.02 0.03 
     
11.Inside succession 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.06* -0.11* 0.07* -0.04* -0.08* -0.10* -0.32* 
    
12.Leader to Leader entry 0.44 0.50 0.04* 0.04* 0.05* 0.02 0.03* -0.12* -0.02 0.12* 0.10* 0.08* -0.49* 
   
13.Leader to Leader exit 0.16 0.37 -0.04* -0.05* -0.05* 0.03* -0.10* -0.17* 0.10* 0.07* -0.19* -0.28* 0.30* -0.03* 
  
14.Domestic experience 0.48 0.50 -0.05* -0.05* -0.06* -0.03* 0.12* 0.14* -0.09* -0.07* -0.13* 0.49* -0.31* -0.03* -0.35* 
 
15.Foreign experience 0.24 0.42 0.08* 0.09* 0.09* 0.02 -0.04* -0.18* -0.09* 0.08* 0.21* 0.39* -0.31* 0.09* -0.22* -0.13* 
* p<0.05 
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TABLE 2 
Ordered probit model for the effects of leader succession and experience on post-succession performance 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Control variables        
Lag performance t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Lag performance t-2 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Lag performance t-3 0.039** 0.039** 0.038** 0.038** 0.037** 0.036** 0.033* 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Tenure 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Takeovers -0.122* -0.121* -0.114* -0.126* -0.096† -0.089 -0.080 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Within-season succession -0.102** -0.104** -0.098* -0.113** -0.085* -0.069† -0.070† 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) 
Promoted leaders -0.236*** -0.234*** -0.227*** -0.225*** -0.255*** -0.217** -0.217** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.069) 
Strategic changes -0.192* -0.191* -0.206* -0.180* -0.210* -0.194* -0.209* 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) (0.081) (0.082) 
Team quality 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.053** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Total experience 0.003 0.004 0.004† 0.003 0.007** 0.001 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Model variables        
Inside succession  0.020 0.074 0.040 -0.011 0.046 0.099† 
  (0.044) (0.050) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.056) 
Leader to Leader entry   0.091*    0.097* 
   (0.040)    (0.041) 
Leader to Leader exit    -0.089†   -0.121* 
    (0.053)   (0.055) 
Domestic experience     -0.132**  -0.097* 
     (0.043)  (0.049) 
Foreign experience      0.156** 0.115* 
      (0.047) (0.054) 
No. of observations 4452 4452 4452 4452 4452 4452 4452 
Degrees of freedom 10 11 12 12 12 12 15 
Chi-squared 90.637 90.639 96.876 92.550 101.836 100.536 114.868 
Log likelihood -4785.417 -4785.309 -4782.756 -4783.850 -4780.422 -4780.159 -4773.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant levels: † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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TABLE 3 
Marginal effects 
 
Variables Coefficients 
(Model 7) 
0 points 
Loss category 
1 point 
Draw category 
3 points 
Win Category 
Control variables     
Lag performance t-1 -0.006 0.002 0.000 -0.002 
Lag performance t-2 0.046*** -0.018*** 0.001** 0.017*** 
Lag performance t-3 0.033* -0.013* 0.001* 0.012* 
Tenure 0.003** -0.001** 0.000* 0.001** 
Takeovers -0.08 0.031 -0.002 -0.029 
Within-season succession -0.070† 0.027† -0.001† -0.026† 
Promoted leaders -0.217** 0.085** -0.009* -0.077** 
Strategic changes -0.209* 0.081* -0.003** -0.077* 
Team quality 0.053** -0.020** 0.001** 0.019** 
Total experience 0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.001 
Model variables     
Inside succession 0.099† -0.038† 0.001** 0.037† 
Leader to Leader entry 0.097* -0.037* 0.001* 0.036* 
Leader to Leader exit -0.121* 0.047* -0.003 -0.044* 
Domestic experience -0.097* 0.038* -0.002† -0.036* 
Foreign experience 0.115* -0.044* 0.001* 0.043* 
Significant levels: † p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
